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Abstract 
This study adopts the Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) to address the underlying differences in 
information security policy compliance between the banking industry and higher education. 
Drawing on the NIT, this study examines how regulative, normative, and cognitive 
expectations influence the internal organizational efforts of staying compliant across both 
industries. Using the Partial Least Square (PLS) method, the analysis results suggest that both 
industries rely on the normative expectation to propel their organizational efforts of attaining 
compliance. However, the main difference lies within cognitive expectation. In the institution of 
higher education, cognitive expectation has an indirect effect on information security policies 
compliance through regulative expectation. On the other hand, cognitive expectation reflects 
the severity of regulatory pressure in the banking industry. Given these findings, this study 
presents theoretical implication and provides suggestions to policy makers on the basis of 
managerial implication. 
 
Keywords:  Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT), cross industry study, information security policy 
compliance 
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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the financial scandals involving Enron and WorldCom, banks had to undergo IT 
auditing and meet stringent compliance regulations, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). As of today, information security breaches are high threats for 
banks (Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report 2010). Security breaches in any banks will 
precipitate serious consequences for the organizations because security breaches will draw negative 
publicity that taints the banks’ reputations, causing losses in profits (Goodhue and Straub 1991). 
In the same token, universities and colleges face the threat of legal liability for irresponsible handling of 
sensitive information (Elliot et al. 1991). Universities and colleges are required to comply with the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) to safeguard student’s information.  It is important to 
protect student’s information as the exposure of sensitive student data, such as social security numbers, 
could easily turn students into identity theft victims.  
However, unlike the banking industry, higher education is characterized by informality, subjectivity, 
infrequent and implicit promotions, and tenure that promise stable employment (Dill 1982). Higher 
education also has loosely coupled systems where the functionality, rewards, sanctions, and departments 
have low interdependency, thus perpetuating the unique characteristics of subsystem or subculture 
(Weick 1976). 
For organizational survival, organizations have to integrate externally legitimated formal structures to 
augment the promise of internal participants and external constituents (Meyer and Rowen 1977). For 
example, to attain information security policy compliance, organizations must respond to the external 
expectations of information security. Then, organizations establish internal expectations for information 
security protection. These external expectations constitute regulative, normative, and cognitive 
expectations (Interligi 2010).   
This study suggests that different industries encounter different external expectations with respect to 
information security safeguards, leading to the differences in the organizational expectations regarding 
information security policy compliance. Specifically, the differences in external expectations between the 
banking industry and higher education may precipitate differences in organizational expectations relative 
to information security protection, thus creating differences in information security policy compliance.  
Therefore, the main objectives of this study are to (1) investigate which external factors motivate the 
information security policies compliance in banking industry and in higher education, and (2) provide 
suggestions to policy makers on how to enhance information security policy compliance in higher 
education and in banking industry. 
Literature Review 
Institution and Neo-Institution Theory 
Institutional theorist, Scott (1995), argues that institutions rest on three pillars – regulative, normative, 
and cognitive – to give meaning and stability to social life. Each pillar represents external expectation that 
organizations are expected to live up to. In details, these three pillars are: 
Regulative pillar stresses activities of sanctioning and monitoring both formal and informal rules. For 
example, regulative pillar highlights the compliance to SOX and GLBA in banking industry and FERPA in 
higher education.  
Normative pillar focuses on social norm or appropriate behavior based on the prescriptive, evaluative, and 
obligatory dimension in social life (Scott 2008). Overall, normative pillar highlights the shared values and 
norms, interpersonal expectations, and valued identities (Javernick-Will and Levitt 2010).  In short, it 
refers to the “right thing to do”. For instance, safeguarding student’s social security numbers to prevent 
the incidents of identity theft represents social obligation (i.e., the right thing to do) of the universities 
and colleges. Also, in the context of information security, professional organizations build normative 
expectation by defining the industry norms (Hu, Hart, and Cooke, 2007). For example, Information 
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Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) is a professional organization that helps to define the 
normative framework for outlining the industry norms related to standardized security mechanism. 
Cognitive pillar signifies the taken for granted value and shared understanding (Scott 2008, pg. 51). 
Specifically, culture, as a part of the cognitive pillar, is a socially constructed symbolic representation that 
shapes the shared belief system (Javernick-Will and Levitt 2010). As a result, this pillar forms the 
perceptions about an event given the shared belief system built on culture. For instance, with the 
incidents of data breaches, the stakeholders will interpret and identify these incidents based upon their 
perceptions built on cultural frame with shared understanding. 
Institution constitutes regulative, normative, and cognitive expectations that serve as a template for 
guiding organizational actions and perspectives (Scott 1995). Hinged on this template, organizations 
conform to their institutional environment to survive. In the context of organizational survival, 
organizations undergo institutionalization to adopt practices that foster legitimacy (Meyer and Rowen 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Legitimacy pertains to the appropriate actions consistent with social 
norms, values, and beliefs (Suchman 1995).  
In particular, organizational survival relies on securing legitimacy from stakeholders through conformity 
to regulative, normative, and cognitive pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Reacting to external 
pressure, organizations undergo coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism to espouse certain 
programs and policies and procedures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kostova and Roth 2002). Under 
coercive isomorphism, a more powerful authoritative (e.g.: federal government) imposes organizational 
patterns (e.g., organizational practices and belief systems) whereas through mimetic isomorphism, 
organizations embrace the patterns of successful organizations to respond to uncertainty (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Kostova and Roth, 2002). With normative isomorphism, organizations employ patterns 
considered appropriate in the environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kostova and Roth, 2002). As a 
result, organizations achieve legitimacy and increase their chances to survive. Accordingly, Neo-
Institutional Theory (NIT) suggests that organizations respond to external pressure by complying with 
federal regulations, by learning from other organizations’ successful responses to uncertainty, and by 
adopting practices that are deemed appropriate in the institution environment. 
Differences between Higher Education and Banking Industry 
In higher education, the governance and decision making are very distinctive as compared to the rest of 
the society because the “bottom up” approach in decision making hands some decision making authorities 
to faculty members (Reis 1997). The institution of tenure clearly separates academia from other 
institutions, since tenure offers, within limits, lifetime employment (Dill 1982). Along the same line, 
higher education promotes professional autonomy (Dill 2003), thus enabling scholars the freedom of 
teaching and carrying out research.  
Regarding the banking industry, the banking culture is significantly different from other industry cultures 
as commercial banks are mostly perceived as hierarchical, bureaucratic, and slow to change (Davis 2004). 
Banking industry today encounters pressure from competitors, investors, and internal resistance to 
change (Davis 2004). Banks are also under the pressure of globalization (Bullock 2003) in addition to 
merger and acquisition, and pressure to perform. This has been followed by a decline in a bank’s “family 
culture” that values executives and employees irrespective of their contributions (Davis 2004). 
Furthermore, formal policies and procedures define banking industry (Argyris 1958).  
Higher education functions in a cultural-cognitive system (Meyer et. al. 2007) that shapes expectations 
for knowledge creation, dissemination, and research innovation (Reis 1997). On the other hand, banks 
operate in a relational system (Scott 2008) wherein the external constituents such as Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) etc. impose immense 
pressure on banks to comply and hold banks accountable for their actions.  
After the financial scandal involving Enron and WorldCom, the banking industry has been confronting 
immense pressure to comply with regulations such as SOX and GLBA. The pressure to comply has 
compelled banks to incorporate information security into their daily operations. Similar to the banking 
industry, higher education is required to stay compliant with regulations like FERPA. Parallel to the 
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violation of federal banking regulation, violating FERPA may result in a lawsuit that adversely affects the 
institution’s public image. 
Additionally, universities and colleges are required to comply with GLBA since they are managing student 
financial aids. Some universities with medical programs have to stay compliant with Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to protect patient’s confidential information. However, unlike 
the banking industry, only a fraction of universities and colleges provide information awareness training, 
making it more difficult to support IT security implementation (Kvavik 2004) and to draft appropriate 
policies and procedures (Rezgui and Marks 2008).  
Cybercrimes target at banking industry and most banks realize the threats and risks in their environment 
(Yeh and Chang 2007). Based on the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report of 2010, the 
increase in online banking has triggered a corresponding jump, from 83% in 2008 to 98% in 2009, in the 
threats to confidential information related to remote access capabilities.  
Finally, organization-stakeholder interaction unfolds opportunities to stakeholder’s influences and 
preferred methods for internal control (Interligi 2010). This enables stakeholders to impose pressures on 
organizations (e.g. banks, universities), urging organizations to meet stakeholder’s expectations. 
Stakeholders of the banking organizations mainly consist of shareholders, the board of directors, 
customers, financial markets, and government (Behery and Eldomiaty 2010) whereas the main 
stakeholders of the higher education are government, students, faculty, administrators, alumni, parents 
and the community where the higher institution resides (Gross and Godwin 2005).  
The following Table 1 and Table 1-1 summarize the major differences between banking industry and 
higher education. We argue that, although both industries face the pressure to comply with regulations, 
this stake is higher in the banking industry. Additionally, the threats and risks related to information 
security are also higher in banking industry than they are in higher education.  
   Table 1. Comparison between Banking Industry and Higher Education 
 Banking Industry Higher Education 
Governance, Decision making, 
and Culture 
• Hierarchical and 
Bureaucratic – slow to 
change 
• Formal policies and 
procedures define 
banking industry 
• Relational system 
• Bottom up management – give 
some decision making authorities 
to faculty members 
• Tenure system 
• Academic freedom 
• Decentralization – lack of system 
integration and understanding 
across different departments 
• Cultural-cognitive system 
Pressure to comply / Regulations High Medium 
Threats and Risks High Medium to Low 
Training High Low 
 
Table 1-1. Differences between Banking Industry and Higher Education 
 Banking Industry Higher Education 
Regulative 
Expectation 
The federal government expects the 
banking industry to comply with 
regulations, such as SOX and GLBA. 
The federal government expects the higher 
education to comply with FERPA, GLBA, 
and HIPAA. 
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Normative 
Expectation 
The stakeholders are shareholders, the 
board of directors, customers, financial 
markets, and government (Behery and 
Eldomiaty 2010). They expect banks to 
prevent: unsolicited advertisements, 
accidental release of personal 
information, misrouting of funds and 
data errors (Earp and Payton 2006).  
The stakeholders are students, faculty, 
administrators, alumni, and the 
community (Gross and Godwin 2005). 
They expect higher education to educate, 
produce innovative research, and create 
and share knowledge (Reis 1997). 
Cognitive 
Expectation 
The banking stakeholders realize the 
threats to banking information security 
(Yeh and Chang 2007) and understand 
that a bad image caused by data breaches 
will bring devastating effects to the bank. 
There is no high information security 
awareness among the stakeholders, 
causing a lack of perception in 
information security (Rezgui and Marks 
2008).  
 
Hypothesis Statement 
Extant literatures uncover the industry differences in perception of risk and risk management. Some 
previous findings revealed that different industries perceive environmental uncertainty, intra-
organizational influence, and degree of structural decentralization differently (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980). 
Environment uncertainty varies across the industries and the structural responses to uncertainty differ 
across industries, as well (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980). Given that each type of industry encounters 
uncertainty in a different form (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980), and that risk is associated with uncertainty 
(Rousseau et al., 1998), each industry shapes the unique perception of risk (Yeh and Chang 2007). Since 
organizations within the same industry face risks of a similar nature, organizations under the same 
industry share a similar level of intensity for risk management processes (Zwikael and Ahn 2011). On the 
other hand, the different nature of risk across industries generates different levels of intensity for risk 
management. Risk management corresponds to information security policies (Harris 2006). Given the 
high level of intensity for risk management, the organizations within the same industry can overtly 
indicate the importance of information security policies to foster security policy compliance (Boss et. al. 
2009).  
Additionally, hinged on the Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT), homogeneity among organizations ascribes to 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mainly, isomorphism refers to the constraining process 
wherein one unit coerces another unit to reach resemblance under the same environmental conditions 
(Hawley 1968).   Highly regulated industries in highly structured environments tend to have 
homogeneous structure, culture, and output (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This suggests that 
“organizations within the same industry sector may exhibit similar compliance cultures” (Interligi 2010, 
pg. 240). Along the same line, security compliance culture shared among organizations in the same 
industry reflects upon the homogeneous, industry-level perception of security policy compliance. 
Alternatively, a different industry may encounter different external expectations, leading to different 
structures, culture, and output. Thus, a different industry may display different organizational 
expectations toward security policy compliance.  
This study compares the banking industry and the higher education due to their similarities and 
differences. Although both industries must comply with regulations, both industries form different values 
in perceived pressure to comply, perceived threats, and perceived risks. Because of (1) the different 
environmental uncertainties related to information security between the banking industry and the higher 
education and (2) isomorphism that begets distinctive industry-level perception of security policy 
compliance for each industry, we hypothesize that the banking industry and the higher education would 
interact with their external uncertainties differently and form different perceptions for information 
security policy compliance; this would then lead to the differences in information security policy 
compliance across industries. The stark contrast between higher education and banking industry may 
draw insights on the external drivers that propel these industries to comply and shed light on the 
mechanism of implementing security practices in different organizational settings.  
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Research Methodology 
Proposed Research Model 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Research Model 
 
Building on the literature review in the preceding section, we constructed the proposed research model 
(see Figure 1) based on two notions. First, there are differences across industries that would lead to the 
differences in information security policy compliance across industries. This notion relies on the concept 
of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and the findings of prior studies stressing that different 
characteristics across industries produce different ways of interacting with external environment across 
industries (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980; Yeh and Chang 2007; Zwikael and Ahn 2011). Using the same 
research model (see Figure 1), we ran the higher education and banking data independently and then 
compared the results to check whether there were any differences in information security policy 
compliance across both industries. 
The second notion draws on the Neo-Institutional Theory (NIT) postulating that organizations will 
initialize internal efforts to meet external expectations so as to secure legitimacy for organizational 
survival (Meyer and Rowen 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Referring to Table 1-1, both banking 
industry and higher education encounter three external expectations. Thus, hinged on the NIT, the 
proposed research model suggests that three external expectations – Regulative (REG), Normative 
(NORM), and Cognitive (COG) expectations – drive universities and banks to stay compliant through the 
internal efforts of (1) Enforcement of Policies and Procedures (POL) and (2) Information Security 
Awareness (AWA). Numerous prior studies posited that POL and AWA represented internal efforts of 
staying compliant within organizations (Boss et al. 2009; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat 2010; Chan, 
Woon, and Kankanhalli 2005; Herath and Rao 2009). 
Enforcement of Policies and Procedures emphasizes the policies and procedures within an organization. 
The efforts of specifying policies and procedures enhance the perceived mandatoriness of security policies 
among the employees (Boss et al. 2009). As a result, this fosters information security policies compliance. 
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Information Security Awareness affects employee’s beliefs with respects to the benefit of compliance and 
the cost of non-compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Organizations want employees to grasp the 
requirements and the objectives of information security (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
Referring to the proposed research model (see Figure 1), the six hypotheses are: 
H1: Regulative expectation drives organizations to enforce information security policies and procedures  
H2: Normative expectation drives organizations to enforce information security policies and procedures  
H3: Cognitive expectation drives organizations to enforce information security policies and procedures 
H4: Regulative expectation drives organizations to raise information security awareness  
H5: Normative expectation drives organizations to raise information security awareness  
H6: Cognitive expectation drives organizations to raise information security awareness 
Questionnaires 
During the questionnaire development, we employed some measurement items used in some of the 
previous studies about information security (i.e., Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Chan et al. 2005; 
Herath and Rao 2009). Our original questionnaire had 20 items measuring the five constructs (i.e., REG, 
NORM, COG, POL, and AWA). Each of these 20 measurement items applied 7-point Likert scale with 1 for 
strongly disagree, 4 for neutral, and 7 for strongly agree.  
A pilot study was conducted to improve the original questionnaire. We invited five college administrators 
(e.g., Dean, Associate Dean, Department Chair, Information Security Officer) of an university and five 
banking professionals (e.g. president of a commercial bank, branch manager, loan officer, officer) to 
review and answer our questionnaires. Based on their responses, we computed the Cronbach’s Alpha and 
the item-to-total score to evaluate the reliability for each construct. Next, using this reliability assessment 
and the feedbacks collected from the pilot study, we refined the measurement items in the original 
questionnaire. The final version of the questionnaire (see Table 2) adopted by this study incorporated 14 
measurement items representing the five constructs. This study used the same measurement instrument 
(see Table 2) for both the higher education and the banking industry samples. 
Table 2: Measurement Items 
Construct Item Description References 
REG 
REG1 Legal action from regulator as a result of data breaches Self-developed 
through referencing 
Hu et al. (2007) REG2 
Realize the legal damages suffered by another 
organization in the same industry due to data breaches 
REG3 Inspection by an authorized third-party regulator  
NORM 
NORM1 Adopt standardized security practices in the industry Self-developed 
through referencing 
Hu et al. (2007) NORM2 Serve the clients through security compliance 
COG 
COG1 Negative publicity due to data breaches Self-developed 
through referencing 
Herath and Rao 
(2009) 
COG2 Loss of prestige due to data breaches 
COG3 Monetary loss due to data breaches 
COG4 Loss of stakeholder’s trust due to data breaches 
POL 
POL1 Formal security policies in the organization setting Adapted from Boss 
et al. (2009) POL2 Formal security policies to protect  computer system 
AWA 
AWA1 Employees realize the potential threats to security Adapted from 
Bulgurcu et al 
(2010) 
AWA2 Educating employees about the cost of security problem 
AWA3 Inform employees of the new threats to security 
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Data Collection 
To collect data from the banking organizations, we spent about six months to repeatedly post our online 
survey in the professional forums such as the BankingInfoSecurity forum in the LinkedIn site. We also 
sent emails to invite the banking employees to participate in our study. These emails were sent to nearly 
100 banking information security professionals via social networking sites (e.g. LinkedIn). For the next 
two months, we distributed email reminders to follow up with the previous email messages we sent out. 
After approximately eight months, we obtained 31 responses.   
Then, upon receiving the permission from some bank presidents, we invited the banking employees to 
participate in our online survey by sending out email attached with a link to the online survey site. 
Particularly, we sent emails to the banking employees from one community bank and two commercial 
banks in the Midwest region of the United States. We received 60 responses from these three banks. Also, 
we spent four semesters to collect data from some of our MBA students enrolling in two universities in the 
Midwest region of the United States. These students were part-time MBA students who were working full-
time in the banking industry. We received 17 responses from this data collection method. 
Overall, we collected 108 responses. These participants were 13 bank tellers (12%), 8 branch managers 
(7%), 8 compliance officers (7%), 6 credit analysts (6%), 5 directors of IT (4.5%), 9 information security 
specialists (8%), 4 IT workers (4%), 4 loan assistants (4%), 5 loan managers (4.5%), 4 mortgage officers 
(4%), 3 trust officers (3%), 9 vice presidents (8%), 3 bank presidents (3%), 27 other (18%) and 
undisclosed (7%). Most of our participants were working in a large bank with more than 400 employees 
and many of them had less than 10 years of working experience (88%). The average age was 33 years old. 
On the other hand, we spent 5 months to collect data for higher education. We sent out emails to faculty 
members, administrators (e.g., Presidents, Provosts, Associate Provosts, Deans, Associate Deans, 
Department Chairs), and staff members (e.g., Information Security Officers, IT personnel) of three state-
funded universities in the Midwest region of the United States. Two of these universities are research-
focused universities and each has more than 20,000 students whereas the other university is a student-
centered university with only 5000 students. The emails invited the recipients to participate by presenting 
the study objectives along with a hyperlink to the online questionnaires. We sent emails to approximately 
250 people. After two months, we sent email reminder to follow up with the previous email messages we 
sent. We also made phone calls and engaged in face-to-face conversation to remind the email recipients to 
participate in this study. Then, after two months, we obtained 100 responses. The participants included 51 
faculty members (51%), 38 administrators (38%), and 11 staff members (11%). About one-third of the 
respondents came from each of the three universities. Almost 70% of the respondents spent less than 10 
years with their universities and their average age was 38 years old. 
Measurement Assessment 
This section uncovers various tests performed to check construct reliability and validity of the measuring 
instrument. The hypothesized model (see Figure 1) consisted of five latent, reflective constructs -- REG, 
NORM, COG, POL, and AWA. We separated the banking sample from that of the higher education so that 
the hypothesis testing for one sample was independent of the other. 
This study employed Partial Least Square (PLS) method and used SmartPLS software for hypotheses 
testing. SmartPLS software functions as a component-based path modeling application hinged on the PLS 
method (Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque, and Straub 2008). We selected PLS method as the PLS path modeling 
is appropriate even with a very small sample size (Chin 1998; Haenlein and Kaplan 2004; Henseler, 
Ringle, and Sinkovics 2009). Unlike the covariance-based Structural Equation Modeling that demands a 
sample size of more than 100 observations (Nasser and Wisenbaker 2003), PLS path modeling works with 
a sample size as low as 50 observations (Chin and Newsted 1999). 
Higher Education Sample 
First, we tested the construct reliability of the measurement instruments for the higher education sample. 
Construct reliability was assessed by examining the Composite Reliability (CR) score (Fornell and Larcker 
1981) and the Cronbach’s alpha of each construct. Results in the following Table 3 show CR values ranging 
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from 0.733 to 0.924 and Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.771 to 0.878. These values exceed 0.70, thus 
proving construct reliability (Chin 1998).  
Table 3. CR, AVE, and Cronbach’s Alpha for the Higher Education Sample 
Construct Composite Reliability AVE Cronbach’s Alpha 
REG 0.8657 0.6824 0.7713 
NORM 0.9020 0.8216 0.7836 
COG 0.9342 0.7803 0.9077 
POL 0.9308 0.8706 0.8515 
AWA 0.9074 0.7658 0.8463 
 
To assess convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE), referring to a measure of variance 
explained by a latent construct for the variance observed in its measurement items, should be at least 0.5 
or higher (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The AVE values, ranging from 0.68 – 0.87 (see Table 3), prove 
convergent validity of the measurement instruments for higher education sample. 
Furthermore, this study adopted bootstrapping with 500 random re-samples followed by examining the t-
values of the outer model loadings. Convergent validity is demonstrated if all the measurement items load 
significantly on their respective latent construct. Overall, for each factor loading, the t-value should be 
larger than 1.96 and its corresponding p-value will be significant at least at 0.05 level (Gefen and Straub 
2005). Table 4 shows that every measurement item significantly loaded on its respective latent construct 
with loading > 0.7, t-value > 2.5, and p-value < 0.001. This thus proves convergence validity. 
Table 4: Factor Loading and t-value for the Higher Education Sample 
Construct Item Factor Loading (t-value) 
REG 
REG1 0.7221***( 8.6949) 
REG2 0.7850***(10.2510) 
REG3 0.8167***(14.9624) 
NORM 
NORM1 0.9214***(26.7761) 
NORM2 0.9023***(21.8076) 
COG 
COG1 0.8455***(4.9488) 
COG2 0.8260***(4.5505) 
COG3 0.7576***(4.2429) 
COG4 0.7163***( 4.8646) 
POL 
POL1 0.9425***(62.2833) 
POL2 0.9174***(33.6074) 
AWA 
AWA1 0.8299***(16.7628) 
AWA2 0.9394***(64.0373) 
AWA3 0.8905***(30.1609) 
***p-value < 0.001 
To assess discriminant validity, two tests were conducted. First, in the AVE analysis, the square root of the 
AVE of each construct must be larger than the correlations of this construct to all the other constructs 
(Chin 1998). The results depicted in Table 5 reveal strong discriminant validity. 
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   Table 5. Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (in shaded cells) for Higher Education Sample 
 REG NORM COG POL AWA 
REG 0.8261     
NORM 0.4983 0.9064    
COG 0.4209 0.3694 0.8833   
POL 0.5723 0.5280 0.2923 0.9931  
AWA 0.5807 0.5184 0.3162 0.5458 0.8751 
 
The second test assessed the cross-loadings of measurement items on the latent constructs. Table 6 shows 
excellent discriminant validity since each measurement item loads higher on its intended construct than 
on any other constructs and the difference in loadings is at least 0.10 (Gefen and Straub 2005). 
 
Table 6. Cross-loadings of Measurement Items on Latent constructs for Higher Education Sample 
      AWA COG NORM POL REG 
 AWA1 0.9193 0.2982 0.4643 0.5236 0.5598 
 AWA2 0.8331 0.2609 0.3832 0.4512 0.5023 
 AWA3 0.8709 0.2695 0.5105 0.4549 0.4594 
 COG1 0.2089 0.8392 0.2728 0.1835 0.3409 
 COG2 0.2347 0.9247 0.3621 0.2170 0.3902 
 COG3 0.357 0.8721 0.2601 0.2832 0.3843 
 COG4 0.2762 0.8951 0.4076 0.3131 0.3654 
NORM1 0.4967 0.3507 0.9186 0.5079 0.4939 
NORM2 0.4402 0.3174 0.8940 0.4460 0.4046 
 POL1 0.4925 0.2775 0.5122 0.9288 0.4899 
 POL2 0.5251 0.2683 0.4743 0.9373 0.5756 
 REG1 0.5509 0.234 0.4577 0.5637 0.8484 
 REG2 0.4272 0.4667 0.3933 0.3211 0.8057 
 REG3 0.4406 0.3913 0.3753 0.4904 0.8236 
Banking Industry Sample 
Table 7 shows construct reliability since the values of CR and Cronbach’s Alpha for all the constructs 
exceed or close to 0.70 (Chin 1998). 
Table 7. CR, AVE, and Cronbach’s Alpha for the Banking Sample 
     Composite Reliability  AVE Cronbach’s Alpha 
 REG 0.8188 0.6015 0.6753 
NORM 0.9081 0.8316 0.7981 
 COG 0.8671 0.6210 0.8007 
 POL 0.9276 0.865 0.8451 
 AWA 0.9175 0.7881 0.8650 
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After bootstrapping with 500 random re-samples, we assessed the t-values of the outer model loadings. 
Table 8 shows that every measurement item significantly loads on its respective latent construct with 
loading > 0.7, t-value > 2.5, and p-value < 0.001. This demonstrates convergence validity. 
Table 8. Factor Loading and t-value for the Banking Sample 
Construct Item Factor Loading (t-value) 
REG REG1 0.7221***(8.0504) 
REG2 0.7850***(10.0813) 
REG3 0.8167***(13.164) 
NORM NORM1 0.9214***(33.2043) 
NORM2 0.9023***(21.721) 
COG COG1 0.8455***(4.1079) 
COG2 0.8260***(3.5989) 
COG3 0.7576***(3.3725) 
COG4 0.7163***(4.4021) 
POL POL1 0.9425***(63.3418) 
POL2 0.9174***(35.4613) 
AWA AWA1 0.8299***(17.0929) 
AWA2 0.9394***(63.175) 
AWA3 0.8905***(33.0846) 
***p-value < 0.001 
In Table 9, the square root of the AVE of each construct is larger than the correlations of this construct to 
all the other constructs, thereby exhibiting discriminant validity (Chin 1998). 
Table 9. Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (in shaded cells) for the Banking Sample 
REG NORM COG POL AWA 
REG 0.7756 
NORM 0.5084 0.9119 
COG 0.4098 0.2915 0.7880 
POL 0.4196 0.5855 0.2221 0.9301 
AWA 0.3803 0.5631 0.1592 0.6537 0.8877 
 
Next, we also examined the cross-loadings of measurement items on the latent constructs to test 
discriminant validity. Table 10 below shows excellent discriminant validity as each measurement item 
loads higher on its intended construct than on any other constructs and the difference in loadings is at 
least 0.10 (Gefen and Straub 2005). 
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Table 10. Cross-loadings of Measurement Items on Latent constructs 
      AWA  COG NORM  POL  REG 
 AWA1 0.8299 0.1433 0.4260 0.5405 0.3561 
 AWA2 0.9394 0.1266 0.5930 0.6404 0.3547 
 AWA3 0.8905 0.1605 0.4591 0.5503 0.3028 
 COG1 0.1673 0.8455 0.3033 0.2373 0.4182 
 COG2 0.0744 0.8260 0.2173 0.0912 0.2687 
 COG3 0.1203 0.7576 0.1522 0.1605 0.3153 
 COG4 0.0987 0.7163 0.2090 0.1479 0.2170 
NORM1 0.5288 0.2641 0.9214 0.5702 0.5068 
NORM2 0.4971 0.2681 0.9023 0.4943 0.4163 
 POL1 0.6545 0.2253 0.5902 0.9425 0.4154 
 POL2 0.5541 0.1848 0.4916 0.9174 0.3612 
 REG1 0.2871 0.2122 0.3939 0.2478 0.7221 
 REG2 0.1897 0.3202 0.3436 0.3385 0.7850 
 REG3 0.3791 0.3949 0.4357 0.3752 0.8167 
Hypothesis Testing 
After evaluating measurement properties of the instrument, we tested all the six hypotheses of the 
hypothesized model based on the PLS structural model (see Figure 1) for the higher education and the 
banking samples. We estimated the path coefficients (β) of the structure model using the bootstrapping 
technique with 500 random re-samples (Mathieson, Peacock, and Chin 2001; White, Varadarajan, and 
Dacin 2003).  
For higher education, to evaluate the significance of the path coefficients, we inspected the significant 
level of each t-value. Results in Table 11 demonstrate that H3 and H6 are not supported, indicating that 
cognitive expectation had no direct effect on the higher education’s efforts of staying compliant. 
Table 11. Hypotheses Testing 
 Higher Education Banking Industry 
Hypothesis β t-value Supported β t-value Supported 
H1: REG → POL 0.4114 4.4398** Yes 0.1608 1.3532 No 
H2: NORM → POL 0.3231 3.1365* Yes 0.5008 4.0530** Yes 
H3: COG → POL -0.0002 0.0017 No 0.0102 0.0889 No 
H4: REG → AWA 0.4193 4.5481** Yes 0.1432 1.4412 No 
H5: NORM → AWA 0.2986 3.2286* Yes 0.5038 4.1787** Yes 
H6: COG → AWA 0.0294 0.3579 No -0.0464 0.4347 No 
**p-value < 0.001 *p-value < 0.01 
On the other hand, as we ran hypotheses testing for the banking industry sample, the hypotheses testing 
results exhibit that only H2 and H5 are supported (see Table 11). That is, only normative expectation has 
direct effect on the banking organizational efforts of staying compliant.  
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Discussion 
Our analysis results reveal that cognitive expectation has no direct impact on information security policy 
compliance in higher education. Historically, universities were established in the medieval period where 
the institution of higher education operated under the cultural-cognitive model in support of social 
progress and justice (Meyer et. al. 2007). To date, modern universities and colleges follow this cultural-
cognitive model to promulgate social progress through knowledge creation and dissemination, teaching, 
and research (Reis 1997), but not through information security safeguard. Due to a lack of perception in 
information security in higher education (Rezgui and Marks 2008), cognitive expectation does not 
emphasize the criticality of information security in higher education. For example, in the University of 
Texas, Austin, nearly 200,000 electronic records consisting of students’ social security numbers had been 
illegally accessed (Marks 2007) and, on March 11, 2005, a stolen laptop from the University of California, 
Berkeley exposed names and social security numbers of 98,000 students (Marks 2007). Nevertheless, 
drawing on the perception of universities’ stakeholders, the academic rankings of these universities were 
not affected at all.  
On the other hand, regulative and normative expectations directly influence the universities’ and colleges’ 
efforts of staying compliant. There is a high correlation between the regulative and the normative 
expectations (0.4983), inferring that the interaction between these two expectations would eventually 
drive information security policy compliance. Market-based model in higher education could explain this 
high correlation. With dwindling resources (e.g., a decline in state support), higher education gradually 
adopts market-based model (Dill 2003; Pusser 2002) to provide services (e.g., continuing education) for 
securing financial health. Essentially, market-based model involves competition in term of tuition fees, 
proximity (i.e., geographical location) and enrollment space (Leslie and Johnson 1974). A shift to market-
based model indicates that higher education become consumer driven (Ruch 2001).   
Under the market-based model, higher education will comply with information security regulations (i.e., 
regulative expectation) to gain competitive advantage if the market demands that universities and colleges 
should safeguard information security as a mean of exercising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Generally, CSR underscores the organizational activities in favor of social well-being (Campbell 2007), 
thus representing normative expectation. That is, as the consumers expect higher education to meet social 
normative expectation through information security safeguard, universities and colleges will comply with 
information security policy to gain a competitive edge in the consumer driven market. For instance, to 
exercise CSR through information security safeguard, universities will protect students’ social security 
number (SSN) by using User Access Control (UAC) that allows only a handful of authorized users 
accessing students’ SSN. This enables universities and colleges to abide by information security 
regulations such as FERPA (i.e., regulative expectation). 
Additionally, we assert that, in higher education, the impact of regulative expectation relies on cognitive 
expectation given the high correlation between cognitive and regulative expectations (0.4209). In the 
institution of higher education, the cultural-cognitive model represents cognitive expectation with a 
deeply ingrained sense of obligations toward social progress (Meyer et. al. 2007). Presently, universities 
and colleges follow this cultural-cognitive model to foster social progress through knowledge creation and 
dissemination, teaching, and research (Meyer et. al. 2007). Under the prevalence of cognitive influence, 
regulatory pressure will prevail only when the regulations are consistent with the academic cultural-
cognitive model (Dill 1982). That is, although cognitive expectation has no direct impact on information 
security policy compliance in higher education, the regulative-based legitimacy (i.e., regulative 
expectation) will take effect only if it is built on the cultural-cognitive model (i.e., cognitive expectation) of 
higher education. For example, any information security policies that hinder knowledge creation and 
dissemination, teaching, and research in the institution of higher education will encounter serious 
resistance that will lead to organizational inefficiency. 
On the other hand, despite the severity of regulatory pressure in the banking industry, only normative 
expectation, but not either regulative expectation or cognitive expectation, directly influences information 
security policy compliance. Similar to the findings of higher education, the institution of banking relies on 
the interrelation between regulation and normative expectations to attain information security policy 
compliance. Although the hypothesis testing results indicate that only the normative expectation directly 
impacts the internal organizational efforts of staying compliant, the high correlation between the 
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regulation and normative expectations (0.5084) suggests the linkage between both expectations 
influences information security policy compliance in the banking industry. Enron and WorldCom 
financial scandals can corroborate this high correlation. After the Enron and the WorldCom scandals, 
SOX was enacted to mandate banks and financial services to employ the internal controls and procedures 
for financial reporting. The enactment of SOX imposes regulatory pressure to ensure that the banking 
organizations exercise ethical conduct for fulfilling social obligation (i.e., normative expectation). That is, 
federal regulations drive banking organizations to meet the social norm, suggesting the connection 
between regulative and normative expectations. 
Reacting to the present regulatory pressure, the banking industry would build well-defined information 
security mechanisms that function as a guideline of information security safeguard for the banking 
organizations. These mechanisms (e.g., IT Governance, COBIT) would develop into the industry security 
standard and eventually transform to social obligations (i.e., normative expectation) that the banking 
organizations are expected to live up to (Hu, Hart, and Cooke 2007). In summary, instead of generating 
direct effect on information security policy compliance in the banking industry, regulative expectation 
drives normative expectation to attain information security policy compliance. 
Additionally, this study reveals that cognitive expectation has no direct impact on information security 
policy compliance in the banking organizations. Rather, it reflects on how regulatory pressure shapes 
stakeholder’s perception toward information security policy compliance. We maintain that the enactment 
of information security laws and regulations in the banking industry indicates a rational choice to avoid 
another financial scandal in the near future. Institution theorist suggested that the process of rational 
choices propels institutionalization (Scott 2008), leading to new cognitive conception. That is, cognitive 
elements arise after the process of rational choices (Scott 2008).  
The rational choice of forcing regulatory pressure drives organizations to undertake institutionalization, 
causing the construction of new meanings and values (Zucker 1977). Such regulatory power becomes an 
impetus that stimulates changes in banking organizations (Hu et al. 2007). For instance, the recent 
changes in the banking organizations are reflected upon the reality wherein every bank has a compliance 
officer to supervise the information security policy compliance. Because of these changes, stakeholders 
gradually form new perceived value of information security hinged on the new meanings related to the 
criticality of information security. Basically, the process of rational choice explains the high correlation 
(i.e., 0.4098) between regulative and cognitive expectations in the banking industry. 
Conclusion 
This study reveals how the differences in institutional environment bring about the differences in 
information security policy compliance between banking industry and higher education. In the institution 
of banking, the external environment consists of a strong relationship between regulative and normative 
expectations. However, only normative expectation directly influences information security policy 
compliance in the banking industry. That is, developed for handling regulatory pressure, the standard of 
information security safeguard plays the most significant role in information security policy compliance in 
the banking industry.  
Likewise, the institution of higher education embodies a strong relationship between the regulative and 
normative expectations but the difference is that both regulative and normative expectations directly 
affect information security policy compliance. Additionally, a stark contrast between higher education and 
banking industry with regard to cognitive expectation emerges despite that cognitive expectation does not 
have any significant effect on information security policy compliance in both industries. The institution of 
higher education is defined by the prevalence of cognitive expectation since its inception in the medieval 
period (Meyer et. al. 2007). This suggests that, although cognitive expectation does not display direct 
effect, its dominance in the institution of higher education produces indirect effect on information 
security policy compliance through regulative expectation. Conversely, the coercive force associated with 
regulative expectation instigates changes in the banks, leading to the changes in cognitive expectation. 
Therefore, cognitive expectation plays a passive role in information security policy compliance in the 
institution of banking.  
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Research Implication and Limitation 
There are various behavioral researches that study antecedents of individual’s policy compliance and non-
compliance to produce theoretical foundations related to the technology acceptance model, organizational 
behavior, social influence etc. (Warkentin and Willison 2009). However, only few studies focus on policy 
compliance at the industry level. Grounded in NIT, this study contributes to information systems research 
by highlighting information security policy compliance between banking industry and higher education. 
This contribution is significant since “industry receives little attention in information systems research 
and theory” despite the important influence of industries on IS activities (Chiasson and Davidson 2005, 
pg. 591). 
Hence, this study differs from many prior behavioral researches of policy compliance in that it (1) 
highlights the external factors driving information security policy compliance at the industry level and (2) 
relates the findings of industry compliance to the organizational and individual level of policy compliance. 
In essence, this study draws a sharp contrast between information security policy compliance in banking 
industry and in higher education, suggesting theoretical foundation and managerial implication related to 
policy compliance at both the organizational and individual level. 
Theoretical Implication 
Drawing on institution theory, banks operate in relational systems with connections between banking 
organizations and external constituents (Scott 2008, pg. 185). In other words, banks are linked to 
government agencies, for example, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and non-profit organizations such as Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association (ISACA). In the banking relational systems, there is a governance unit that applies 
regulative and normative controls (Scott 2008, pg. 186) to the banks. Mainly, governance units constitute 
regularized controls arranged by authorities and legitimate parties (Scott 2008, pg. 186). 
This study suggests that, normative expectation, built on regulative expectation, drives information 
security policy compliance in the banking industry. That is, the governance unit of the banking relational 
systems exerts normative pressure/expectation hinged on regulatory pressure/expectation to drive banks 
to comply. Accordingly, normative expectation could form the perceived norms of security policy 
compliance in the banking organizations. In other words, normative pressure that compels banks to 
comply with regulations shapes internal organizational norm. This notion aligns with the Fear Appeal 
Model (FAM) in that social influence, referring to perceived norms within the firm, could promote 
employees’ information security policy compliance (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Authority could 
highlight the perceived norms within the firm to cultivate employee’s behavior for information security 
policy compliance.  
In this respect, this study proposes a theoretical implication of its findings - in information security policy 
compliance context, how normative expectation shapes social influence that positively impacts employee’s 
intention to comply (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). In particular, how industry norms shape or relate to 
organizational norms. For instance, with respect to information security safeguard, a theoretical 
framework could be established to explain how industry norms (e.g., IT Governance such as COBIT and 
COSO), defined in the banking relational systems, shape organizational norms/social influence in support 
of information security policy compliance among employees. This relationship should be investigated 
across different industries to find a common pattern or the differences.  
Additionally, the research findings suggest that cognitive expectation affects regulative expectation in 
higher education. Unlike the banking industry, higher education functions in cultural-cognitive systems 
(Meyer et. al. 2007) wherein its cognitive model dictates how universities and colleges should handle 
regulatory pressure. In particular, cognitive model defines cultural frame that serves to interpret, identify, 
and perceive events in a way that establishes meanings (Scott 2008, pg. 187). The cultural frame of higher 
education provides some flexibility for higher education to manage regulatory pressure, thereby allowing 
higher education to be less strictly accountable for external constituents in term of information security 
safeguard. Hence, this study proposes that industries operate on a cognitive framework that defines 
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regulatory pressure will less likely be impelled to attain policy compliance. This proposition can serve as a 
foundation to explore the industry-level and/or organizational compliance from a cognitive perspective. 
Managerial Implication  
This study makes some suggestions for practical implication as well. Since cognitive expectation is a 
hidden force in the institution of higher education, promoting information security policy compliance in 
the university settings would require policy makers to align information security policy with the cognitive 
model of higher education characterized by academic freedom in favor of knowledge dissemination and 
creation, innovation research, and teaching. Prior to drafting policies, universities should form 
collaborative efforts to foster mutual understanding among the policy makers and professors/researchers. 
With mutual understanding, policy makers can then delineate useful guidelines to safeguard information 
security while not violating academic freedom. For instance, policy makers can draft a policy that requires 
academic researchers to encrypt sensitive data and decrypt them using effective mechanism without 
delaying information sharing.  
Additionally, information security policy which aligns with the cognitive model of higher education would 
promote self-efficacy (Warkentin, Johnston, and Shropshire 2011) that shapes end-user’s information 
security policy compliance (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). This is because information security policy 
that is relevant to existing cognitive model of higher education would emphasize on situation support 
(e.g., academic freedom, innovation research) and would also persuade higher education’s employees 
(especially researchers and professors) to participate in information security policy compliance. Situation 
support and persuasion are major contributors to self-efficacy (Warkentin et al. 2011) that shapes end-
user’s security policy compliance (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). 
On the other hand, normative expectation is a dominant force in the institution of banking. In this 
respect, policy makers in the banking industry can draft policies to encourage employees to continue their 
education to learn about the new industry standard for staying complaint. For example, attending 
conferences held by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) which is a well-
respected, non-profit organization in charge of disseminating industry-level knowledge related to 
information assurance. 
In addition, the presence of banking employees in highly recognized conferences and/or workshops will 
leave an impression that banks are paying attention to the industry-level mechanism of information 
security safeguard. That is, banks are aware of the industry norms for information security protection. 
This will make banks appear legitimate, enabling them to fulfil normative-based legitimacy.  
Limitation  
Finally, this study is not without limitation. This study encountered difficulty in data collection and the 
sample size was relatively small (N=108 and 100 for banking industry and higher education respectively). 
Another limitation is the generalizability of the research findings. This study mostly collected data of 
higher education from only three public colleges and universities. Additionally, this study collected 
banking data from only three community and commercial banks in the Midwest region of the U.S.. Hence, 
the researchers may want to exercise their judgment when referencing these research findings. 
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